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Many government regulatmns amz at forcing or reducing firms to make some investment Fhe Erergy Pohcy and Conservation Act of 1975 reqmred firms to increase the f, ael ef~cmncy of the cars they produce, which callec for investments in tools to produce front wheeI drive ~ehmles, research and dcx elopment rote hghter wmght materials mid ~o on "Ihe issue of how Fad prices affect the Incennves of firms to produce fuel efficient cars ~s central to the debate about the effectiveness of Corporate Fuel Economy Averages mandated b3 the Act (see CrarhdalI. 1986 , Greene, 1990 , and more generally Hassett and Metcalf, I993) q?he 1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Act were exphmtly technology forcing, calling for 90% reductions in emlssmn by 1975, an unachlevable goal with the technolog~ avmIable in 1970 Similarly, electric utllmes were reqmred to reduce emissions of sulphur by mstalhng scrubbers Th~s paper asks whether hnear taxes (levied on tl e externality generated by consumer) can achmve the first best opt> nmm by inducing consumers to restrict use of a good generating extemahtms, and reducing firms to produce goods generating httle of the externahty for a gwen level of use I shall show that under some con&-tmns of monopoly the answer is no Government may then want to regulate duectly (by command and control) the product a finn produces The questmn of how effect~,m different types of regulation can be was addressed m a classic artmle by We~tzman (1974) , who shows that when uncertainty about costs ~s low and the marginal cost curve is flat, then regulatmn by quantity instead of by price can be optimal ~ My work also bmlds on the papers by Mflhman and Prince (1989) and Jung et a! (1996) who exarnine the mcentwes of firms to invest In new technology under dlffment regulatory methods The mare differences between our papers are as follows Whereas earher works examine only a compet~tlve industry, I focus on monopoly The dfffment assumptions matter to the results Earlier works consider a firm which both generates an externality and invests m a new technology I consider consumers whose use of a good generates the externahty, The Wmtzman model, however, cannot justify using command and control regulatmn of fuel efficiency or of automobile em~ssmns The government wanted firms to adopt unproven technology who~e costs were highly uncertain (see House Report No 94-340, Committee on Interstate and Formgn Commerce, on PL-94-163, Energy Policy and Conservatmn Act of 1975, p 88) Such uncertainty under the Weltzman model would call fol regulation by price Instead, the regulatmns specified technological standards 255 but who can use a new technology only ff producers have an incentive to produce new goods Th~s latter problem arises in automobde em~ssmns (whore producers can install catalytm converters), or m energy use (where producers can manufacture automobiles with higher fuel efficiency) The problem I consider also arises when firms are consumers For example, airhne companies may create noise when they fly planes, but the awhnes must rely on producers of aeroplanes (such as Boeing and A~rbus) to mtroduce quieter planes Notice that m the examples just presented, the products sold are d~fferentx-ated so each producer can have market power My exammatmn of monopoly, as an extreme case, can therefore be relevant to regulatory pohcy
Assumptions
Consider a good used by consumers that generates an extemahty The level of the externahty can be reduced by inducing consumers to make less use of the good and by reducing firms to produce a good whmh generates less of the extemahty for any level of use Any tax must therefore affect two varmbles -lntensl~ of use and investment declsmns by firms
To be more specific, I shall consider pohcy to reduce energy use by cars Sup-pose all consumers are identical The number ofconqumers is n so that the total number of ears ~s n 2
In the absence of taxes, let the pn~ate margmaI cost of driving be zero The mverse demand curve per driver is V(x), the area under this curve and above the price lS consumer surplus Cars can be of two types meffiment, wtth hagh energy use (indexed by H) or efficmnt, w~th low energy use (indexed by L) A car ol type driven q hallos uses q)~, gallons of gasohue Socml damage caused by aggregate gasohne use x is C(x) with C'(x)>O and C"(x) >-0 For slmphmty let the mtertemporal disc ount rate be zero and let a car have a fi~ed hfe Thus, q and other variables describe quantities for the hfe of each car
Perfect competition
Though tins paper i'bcuses on a monopohzed or cartehzed industry, for purposes of compm lson I shall first discuss a coinpetm,ve industry Let the marginal cost of producing a car of type t be R'~ Government imposes a tax on gasohne But since the two types of cars have different fuel efficmncms, the ratio of the taxes per mite Let a tractmnfof cars be efficient and a fractmn (1 f) be meffiment Socml welfare ~s
The first order condmon forf~s that
Suppose the gasohne tax per gallon is set at C', where C' ts evaluated at ItS socmlly optlmal kvel The tax will reduce a consumer to ahoose the value of qH or of qL where marginal private benefit (V'(q,)) equals marginal socml cost (C'k,)
A consumer will be indifferent between bu ¢ing an efficmnt rather than an inefficmnt car if h~s consumer surplus is the same Since h,s tax payment IS C')~,q. and the cost of a car is K~. indifferent reqmres that 2For sufficmntly h~gh benefit from using a car a socmlfy optimal solutmn must ha,,e tbm characterlstlc 
Monopoly
Consider next an industry, with only one producer, suppose the lnvestmem necessary to produce cars of a pamcular t)pe is a fixed rather than a variable cost, and that the ntunber &cars sold ~s set at n Call the fixed cost nK, Clearly, then, rather all or none of the cars produced will be fuel effiment The problem I address thus concerns the quality of a product a monopolist produces 3 It xs well known that a monopohst resmets output and thus can generate less of an extemahty than does a competmve Industry The point made here dtffers I suppose that the monopolist's quantW of output is fixed and so questions of underproduction do not appear If all consumers are identical and if each consumer purchases one umt of the good, then the monopohst will set a price that extracts all consumer surplus The following anaIysis makes that assumptmn Note, however, that the qualitative results derived are not knife-edge results and will apply to more general models, which could allow fbr heterogeneous consumers, var~-able purchases and so on I shall consider the monopohst's problem first graphically and then analytmally In Figure 1 a representative consumer's demand curve for travel over the hfenme of a car IS Dd All other variables depmted are also per capita The marginal socml cost of drlwng with a fuel efficmnt car ~s OL, the corresponding curve for an Inefficient car is OH Suppose the socially optimal solutmn calls for efficmnt cars The socmlly opt~ma[ level of din'rag per capxta xs then qL, where the marginat social cost curve intersects the demand curve Though government usually imposes a tax on gasollne rather than on mileage, for a given X, one tax can be transformed into the other For our purposes It ~s convenient to analyse a tax per mde A tax oft L per rode dnven on an efficient car wall lead drivers to choose qL But we must also consider the profltablhty of producing effiment cars Suppose the monopolist prices cars to extract all consumer surplus Then w~th effiment For a seminal analysis of such a problem see Spence (1975) who, however, does not conmder externalmes or taxation Moreover, his results concerning the differences between the socml gains and the increased profits arising from a quahty ~mprovement reqmre that consumers differ That assumptmn ~s unnecessary for my results Commumcatton 257 cars it can charge a price equal to the area ot triangle Dt,L What if the firm produced inefficient c~rs 9 A tax per mile on an efficient ca~ oft L s a tax per mile on an inefficient car oft H = t L ~H/LL The maximum price the monopohst could charge for an inefficient car is the area of trlang e DtHlt Thus, the firm will produce efficient cars if the capital cost per car is less than the a~ea tHltLt L But social optlmahty Imposes a different condmonthe firm should produce efficmnt cars if the cost is less than the area OL H
The firm may therefore have either too much or too hltle mcentlve to produce efficient cars Indeed, there may exist no hnear tax that makes the production of efficient cars Frofitable A low tax imposes a low penalty on drwlng an efficient car, reducing demand for an efficient car A high tax causes consumers to drive little even with an efficient car, and so again co~asumers benefit little from buying an efficmnt rather than lncfficmnt car Analytic proof is gwen below
A hnear example
For my purpo~,,es all the results of interest appear with linear demand and marginal co,,t curves Let the marginal social cost pel driver when each car is of type l and is driven qt rmles be Ltqt Let each consumer's demand curve be q = 1 -mp, where m is a parameter Inverting gives the marginal xalue of travel, p = (1 -q)/m
The socially optimal solution for a car of type t has the private marginal cost per male on a car of type t equal the socml marginal cost per mile Given our demand curve, social optlmahty requires that q, = 1/(m2r + 1) The tax per mile which suppoJts lhis solutmn is t~ ---(1 -q,)/m = L/(mL I + 1 ) Socml cost per capita, SC,, is the captal cost K,, ~us the integral of marginal cost Define 5'C~ ~-
The firm's revenue per car ~s a consumer's wflhngness to pay or
which sunphfi¢ s to 1 2m(m~. I + 1)2
Define S~I~ -= S,W t -K t where SW~ is socml welfare per p~son when each uses a car of type z Then S~'~ =-CS~ +q,t,-SC TM, or ", 1
ST4 5 -
The firm s gain from producing efficient rather than Inefficient cars is the difference in consumer's wflhngness to pay (after taxes) for the two types of cars We find that 1 CS L -CS H2m(mL + I) 2 1 2m(m~'-H + I) 2
Compm'e this to the social gains from producmg efficient rather than inefficient cars This gain (ignoring investment costs)
The ratm of such social gain to increased revenue is
As ~s easily verified, the derivative of this ratio is positive and for sufficiently high values of m the ratio ~s arbitrarily large 4 Thus, the reduction In soc,al damage from the use of efficient cars can exceed the increase in the firm's revenue from selling them If the difference In costs, n(K t -KH), is large, then the firm will have insufficient lncentwe to produce efticmnt cars To dlustrate the result further, consider a numerical example Let the demand curve be q = 1 -10p Let the marginal social cost per driver when each car ~s fuel efficmnt and is drwen qt miles be 0 l q~ The corresponding marginal socml cost for inefficmnt cars is 0 2qH Appljfmg the previous equations we find that SW c = 0025, SW~ = 00167, CS t = 0 0125 and CS H = 0 0056 Thus 0gnormg capital costs) the social gain per car from fuel efficient cars exceeds the firm's added revenue from selhng them by 0 0014, which ts about 20% of the possible increase m a firm's revenue That ~s, the &florence between the firm's incentive to invest m fuel efficient cars and the socml benefits from the investment can be sigmficant
The previous anal~s~s apphes when government charges the socially optimal tax for a given type of car used -that tax may not reduce the firm to produce the proper types of car Government may therefore do better by setting a (second best) tax which differs from marginal social cost In part~ctllar, it can set t H so high that the firm earns no profits by producing inefficient cars and set t L suffiemntly low so that the firm can charge a price which exceeds K L This tax may have to be set lower than the margmaI socml cost of driving with an efficient car marginal cost pricing can be suboptimal Moreover, when the tax differs from marginal social cost, a problem of time inconsistency arises After the firm makes the investment and produces efficient cars, a benevolent government has an lncentwe to maximize social welfare by setting a first best tax, equal to marginal social cost and not below ~t A fim~ which recognizes these governmental incentives therefore has insufficient mcentwe to make the investment government desires Rather than rely on incentives provided by taxes, government may therefore have to reI), on command and control regulations which specify the emissions controls cars must have or which set fuel efficiency standards Such regulanon thces a credlbdlty problem m the mmal penod-will government follow through on ItS threat to shut down firms which woIate the regulatory standards But command and control regulation does not face a time inconsistency problem -a benevolent government will want to ~mpose a tax on fuel equal to the marginal socml damage it generates and need not worry that such a tax may gwe msufficient incentwe for firm to ln'~est
